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ALFRED J. FOWERS, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant. , 
vs. 
DONAill GURNEY and !RETA F. 
GURNEY, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
\ CASE 
) NO. 11,278 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The case is one of foreclosure of a real estate mort-
gage, but the legal question on appeal involves bankruptcy 
and the entitlement of the plaintiff below to a deficiency 
judgment against Donald Gurney, one of the defendants. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
At the time of the pre-trial, plaintiff orally moved the 
court for summary judgment for a decree of foreclosure, 
and defendants orally moved the court for summary judg-
ment upon the i~ue of plaintiff's entitlement to a deficiency 
judgment in the event the property did not sell for enough 
to pay the amount of plaintiff's note and mortgage (R. 77). 
It was stipulated by counsel that plaintiff was not entitled 
to a deficiency judgment against defendant, Ireta F. Gur-
ney, and that the obligation sought to be foreclosed by 
p:aintiff was properly scheduled by defendant, Donald Gur-
ney, in his bankruptcy schedules of his Petition in Bank-
ruptcy filed on March 7, 1967 (R. 76). Plaintiff's con· 
tention that he is entitled to a deficiency judgment against 
defendant. Donald Gurney, is based upon his claim that 
somehow the obligation which he is attempting to foreclose 
dated July 2, 1965, arose after the filing of Gurney's peti-
tion in bankruptcy on l\1arch 7, 1967 (R. 76). The trial 
court ultimately ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to a 
deficiency judgment against defendant, Donald Gurney, for 
the J'ea$OIJ1 that the obligation arose sometime before his 
filing of his petition in bankruptcy (R. 78). Plaintiff then 
filed affidavits as to the amounts owing on the obligation, 
and caused to be signed and filed in the lower cowt Find· 
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a iDecree of Fore-
closure wherein the property was ordered sold and the pro-
ceeds paid to the plaintiff, but specifically provided that no 
deficiency judgment should be awarded against the defend· 
ants (R. 79-81). No further steps have been taken by 
plaintiff to have the prope1rty so~d pursuant to the fore-
closure decree, he having elected to file an appeal to the 
Supreme Court from the lower court's adverse ruling on 
his contention that he is entitled to a deficiency judgment 
on his Amended Complaint, should there be a deficiency. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents believe the ruling of the trial court with 
respect to plaintiff's non-entitlement to a deficiency judg· 
ment as against defendant, Donald Gurney, is correct, and 
seeks only an affirmation of that ruling in this Court 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as set forth by appellant are 
not necessarily incorrect but in defendants' view they are 
somewhat misleading, and are incomplete to properly pre-
srnt the legal issues to the Court. 
The Court's attention is specifically directed to the 
facts as found by the trial court on October 24, 1967 (R. 
55-56). No appeal was then or is now made from those 
findings, and it is clear therefrom that it was highly im-
proper for the plaintiff to have entered the original defi-
ciency judgment on March 10, 1966, inasmuch as the par-
ties had a complete meeting of the minds and · an agree-
ment several days before that time. to-wit, the latter part 
of February, 1966, for the reinstatement of ithe 1965 note 
and mortgage. Thereafter, as both parties agree, and as 
the lower court found, def.endant, Gurney, made payments 
to the plaintiff in the exact amount of the monthly pay-
ments called for by the original note for more than eight 
months, ( R. 56 and R. 34-36) , all of which were accepted 
by tihe plaintiff and credited on the original 1965 note and 
mortgage, (R. 37 and 59). It was more than thirteen 
months after the agreement to reinstate, during all of which 
r"eriod the conduct of the parties was consistent with rein-
statement and inconsistent with anything else, when de-
fendant Gurney's p~tition in bankruptcy was filed. This 
w~ on March 7, 1967. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TIIE OBLIGATION BEING SUED UPON IN THIS 
\CTION AROSE IN THE LATTER PART OF FEBRU-
4 
ARY, 1%6, OR PRIOR THERETO, PURSUANT TO A}; 
AGREEl'v1ENT OF THE PARTIES, AND NO'I' BY ACT 
OF THE COURT ON OCTOBER 24. 1967. 
If Point I of plaintiff's argument is understood cor· 
i-ectly, he is contending tha.Jt the indebtedness which is be-
ing sued upon in this action arose on October 24, 1967, be-
cause that was the date when the court made its decision 
that the 1965 note and mortgage had b2en reinstated, and, 
therefore, coming after the petition in bankruptcy. which 
was filed on l\farch 7, 1967, it is a new obligation not 
affected by the prior bankruptcy. 
I:t is hard to believe that plaintiff is serious in this con-
tention for it is elementary that the court cannot, does not, 
and will not make a contract for the parties which they do 
not make for themselves. 17 Am. Jur. 2nd 413. The trial 
court has specifically found in the case at bar and the 
same is nm disputed on this appeal, that the parti€\S, them-
selves, reinstated the note and mortgage sued upon herein 
by an agreement which they made in the latter part of 
February, 1966, and that the agreement which they made 
was fully performed by boith sides by August 23, 1966, at 
the latest (R. 78 and 55-57). Either date is well before the 
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, which occurred on 
March 7. 1967. 
Plaintiff has cited no case or other authority holding 
to the contrary. The quotations from CJS set forth in 
plaintiff's brief may be good law, but the principles cited 
therein are not applicable in this case. 
POINT II 
THERE HAS BEEN NO PROMISE TO P .AJ.Y TIIE 
INDEBTEDNESS SINCE THE ADJUDICATION OF 
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BANKRUPTCY ON THE PEITl'ION FILED BY THE 
DEFENDANT, DONALD GURNEY, ON MARCH 7, 1967. 
In his Point II, plaintiff seems to state in effect that 
because of defendants' motion being filed on March 20, 
1967, which was some 13 days after the petition for bank-
rup~cy was filed, the making of such motion constituted 
an "acknowledgement" of the debt by defendant, Gurney, 
and that somehow an acknowledgement of the debt revived 
the same after bankruptcy and then created a legally en-
forceable obligation unaffected by the bankruptcy. 
On the general question as to when a discharged debt 
is revived, the rule has been set forth by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Allen v. Feriguson, 18 iWall, 1, 3, 2 
L. ed. 854, wherein the court said: 
"All the authorities agree in this, that the promise made 
by which a discharged debt is revived must be clear. 
distinct, and unequivocal. It may be an absolute or a 
conditional promise, but in either case it must be un-
equivocal." 
In 10 Am. Jur. 2d at page 619, the editors state as fol-
lows: 
"To be effective as a revival of a discharged debt, the 
pro:mise must be either express or directly implied: ht 
the terms used; it cannot be implied simply from con-
duct recognizing the d.eibt, - for example, from a pay-
ment on account of either principal or interest. A 
simple acknowledgement of the justness of the debt 
and of its present existence as a debt formerly ieon-
tracted and now unpaid, or the expression of a hope, 
desire, expectation, or intention to pay, is not suffi-
cient to revive a discharged debt." (Emphasis supplied. 
Se-e also 75 ALR 580, wherein begins a comprehensive 
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annotation relating to the question as to the revival 
of a debt by a bankrupt's subsequent promise to pay.) 
H is further the general rule that the unequivocal pro-
mise must be made by the debtor direc:t to the creditor or 
his attorney or agent (9 Am. Jur. 2d 620). 
We invite the Court to examine the language of the 
motion and supplement tlle·reto which appear on pages 31· 
33 of the Record, and we are confident that it must con· 
elude that no clear, distinct, and unequivocal promise on the 
part orf the defendant to pay the obligation can be read 
therein. 
In the California case of Brink vs. Brink, 299 Pac. 2d 
991, involving a fact situation similar to the case at bar, 
but factually more fa vora:ble to the plaintiff on the same 
issue raised herein by the defendants, the court held that 
an application for final divorce based upon a property set· 
tlement agreement containing a promise to pay $1800.00 
enteir·~d into prior to bankruptcy did not revive the obliga· 
tion to pay the $1800.00. In that case the discharge in 
bankruptcy of the obligation to pay $1800.00 occurred after 
the interloc:utory decree and before the application was 
made for final decree based upon the prcrp.zrty settlement 
containing the promise to pay $1800.00. Holding that the 
application for final decree was not a "prom.is~" to pay the 
discharged obligation, the court said: 
"When a debt has been discharged by proceedings in 
insolvency, or has become barre::i by the statute of 
limitations, the remedy to enforce the payment of the 
debt is gone, but the moral obligation to pay it still re-
mains, and is good consideration for a new promis' 
to make such payment. (Citing case,;) And it is wr!l 
settled that when an action is brought to recover up-0n 
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a new promise and to support the acti.o.- it must ap-
pear that the promise was clear, distinct.. unconditional, 
and unequivocal. (Citing more cases.) 
"When plaintiff sought and obtained the fina1 decree 
he applied for and obtained neither more nor less than 
he had the right and pawer to apply for and obtain. 
We cannot spell out of that a promise to pay the dis-
charged obligation." (Emphasis supplied.) 
We contend, ·in the same fashion, that when the mo-
tion was made to set aside the deficiency judgment entered 
:mrreptitiously and improperly on March 10, 1966, defend-
ants applied for and sought no more nor less than they bad 
the right and power to apply for and obtain, and that no 
dear, distinct, and unequivocal promise to pay the sched-
ul.€d obligation can be reasonably spelled out from the fa.ct 
ot making the motion or the language used therein, or in 
the lower court's rulings thereon. 
If by some tortuous method, the motion of defendants 
might be construed as a "promise" to pay, then defendants 
would have to and did take the position in the lower court 
that any "promise" to pay would have to be made by him 
or his authorized agent, and that.his counsel, who prepared, 
signed, and filed the motion, had absolutely no authority 
to promise to pay thz plaintiff anything. It would be more 
than ludicrous if any presumption is indulged in that de-
ft:ndants' counsel was given the authority to promise to 
pay the very obligation about which he was employed to 
defend against. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully conclude that the contentions of the 
plaintiff in his Points I and II are entirely without merit; 
that the court on October 24, 1967. by its decision did nu! 
and could not create any obligation which the parties them. 
selves did not create at som2 prlor time, which in this case 
was the latter part of February, 1966, or at the very latest, 
August 23, 19S6, either date well b2fore the filing of the 
petition in bankruptcy; that the filing of the motion to de-
clare the original deficiency judgment satisfied, filed by 
defendants' counsel on March 20, 1967, under no legal au· 
thority can be construed as a "promise" to pay the sched· 
uled obligation sought to be foreclosed herein; and finally, 
it would be absurd to believe, as plaintiff contends, that 
defendants' counsel had any authority whatever to bind 
the defendants to pay the very obligation which he was 
employed to defend against. 
We conclude, that the trial court committed no revers· 
ible error, and that its decision rendered herein should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALDRICH. BULLOCK & NELSON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 
By: J. Robert Bullock 
